Two names that consistently flood our inbox whether from members or the public are UnitedHealth and Intel. Every week, without fail, we field at least a couple of questions about one or the other.
So, here’s our take on both in one clear-cut overview:
UnitedHealth (UNH)
While it’s a behemoth in health insurance, the sector simply isn’t our specialty. We don’t see a strong edge here. The regulatory environment, rising medical costs, and policy risks make it a tough space to navigate, and that’s not where we want to allocate focus.
Intel (INTC)
A once-dominant player in semiconductors, Intel has fallen far behind in the chip race. In our view, the most realistic value scenario here would come not from a turnaround, but from a break-up or sale of business units. The recent move by the U.S. government to take a 10% stake doesn’t inspire much confidence either. Historically, such arrangements haven’t boded well for long- term shareholders, and we don’t expect this time to be different.
Bottom Line
We’re sitting out on both. UnitedHealth doesn’t align with our strengths, and Intel looks more like a value trap than an opportunity unless the story shifts toward asset sales.
Lets Start with UNH
If you’ve ever wanted to see what a corporate five-alarm fire looks like, UnitedHealth (UNH) is living it right now. The $400 billion giant isn’t just an insurer anymore it’s a vertically integrated empire controlling doctors, clinics, the pharmacy pipeline, payments, and data. And yet, it’s facing heat from every angle: the DOJ, Congress, state regulators, physicians, hospitals, angry policyholders, and most critically investors who’ve seen hundreds of billions in market cap erased in recent months.
But here’s where the story gets interesting:
Current Price: ~$300
Trailing Multiple: 12x earnings (historical avg: 25x)
Target 2026 EPS: $24
If UNH simply reverts to its historical multiple, you’re looking at ~$600 a share a potential double. Even at 20x, that’s about $480, or a 60% upside from here. And unlike many companies caught in crisis, demand isn’t the issue. An aging population, steady employer coverage, and continued Medicare Advantage expansion mean the revenue base is strong. The real question is medical costs and once quarterly prints show stabilization, investors may quickly reprice the name.
The Setup:
Near-term = volatile headlines, political risk, rising scrutiny.
Long-term = a potential recovery trade where earnings growth + multiple expansion could generate outsized returns.
For investors willing to stomach the noise, UNH may be less a meltdown and more an opportunity disguised as chaos.
The unraveling of UnitedHealth’s stock slide didn’t start with balance sheets it began with a tragedy. In December 2024, the shocking murder of Brian Thompson, CEO of subsidiary UnitedHealthcare, sent shockwaves through the company. Executives were shaken, safety fears rippled through the C-suite, and morale fractured at the top.
Then came the financial blow. Early 2025 marked UnitedHealth’s first earnings miss since 2008. Elevated medical costs in Medicare Advantage exposed cracks in forecasting models, forcing management to pull full-year guidance. Revenue came in at $109.6 billion vs. $111.6 billion expected, with EPS of $7.20–$7.27 just shy of consensus.
It wasn’t a disastrous miss, but it shattered the illusion of invincibility.
The result? A sell-off that compounded investor unease and ended with CEO Andrew Witty’s resignation on May 12, 2025.
But the pain didn’t stop there. The Wall Street Journal revealed the DOJ is probing UnitedHealth’s Medicare Advantage billing practices a potential existential issue given how central MA is to growth. On top of that, the company faces an antitrust challenge to its $3.3 billion Amedisys acquisition, clouding expansion plans in home health.
The takeaway: What began as a tragedy spiraled into financial missteps and regulatory crossfire. For investors, it’s less about whether UNH can generate demand it can but whether it can stabilize leadership, contain costs, and navigate Washington’s microscope without more lasting damage.
UnitedHealth Group (UNH) just got a vote of confidence from Wall Street’s heaviest hitters. Berkshire Hathaway disclosed in a new SEC filing that it built a 5+ million share stake worth $1.6 billion in the second quarter, marking Warren Buffett’s entrance into the beaten-down insurer.
UNH shares, down 40% this year and the worst performer in the Dow, jumped 13% Friday on the news.
Berkshire isn’t alone. Billionaire David Tepper’s Appaloosa Management bought 2.3 million shares, while Lone Pine Capital, led by Stephen Mandel, added 1.7 million shares. Quant powerhouses Renaissance Technologies and Two Sigma opened new positions, and Marshfield Associates, a concentrated $7.5 billion D.C.-based shop, scooped up 1 million shares making UNH 4% of its portfolio.
The timing of these buys remains unclear, as quarterly 13F filings only provide snapshots as of June 30. Still, the pattern is clear: some of the sharpest investors in the game see opportunity in UNH’s collapse. With the stock trading at 12x earnings vs. a 25x historical multiple, the bet is that litigation, cost spikes, and leadership turbulence are temporary while demographics and demand for care remain a powerful tailwind.
Bottom line: When Buffett and Tepper circle the same name, the market pays attention. UnitedHealth’s recovery won’t be smooth, but the entry of “smart money” signals that the stock’s darkest days may already be behind it.
UnitedHealth Group (UNH) posted another bruising quarter, missing Wall Street’s Q2 earnings expectations and slashing its 2025 outlook. The health care giant now projects adjusted EPS of at least $16 per share for 2025, a sharp reset from the withdrawn forecast in May, when rising medical costs first forced management to pull guidance. Analysts, by contrast, had been modeling $20.64 per share, according to FactSet.
Q2 results underscored the weakness: $4.08 per share in earnings on $111.6B revenue, below the $4.48 EPS consensus even as sales slightly beat. The miss comes as CEO Andrew Witty’s abrupt exit in May handed the reins back to veteran Stephen Hemsley, tasked with stabilizing a company that hasn’t delivered what analysts call a “United-type quarter” in more than two years.
The new outlook has sparked three key debates on Wall Street:
Have earnings been reset properly?
Bank of America says UNH’s $16 EPS target looks like a “reasonable rebasing,” but warns the recovery must come from core fundamentals medical cost ratios (MLR) rather than cost-cutting optics.
Can Medicare Advantage deliver?
October’s release of 2027 CMS Star ratings will be pivotal in determining UNH’s eligibility for quality bonuses. Historically a strength, analysts now fear mismanagement could open the door to a negative surprise.
What about regulatory risks?
The 2027 Medicare Advantage rate update, due February 2026, could bring fresh coding adjustments another headwind if costs don’t stabilize first. The takeaway: UnitedHealth’s valuation is already compressed, but trust in management execution is thin.
Bulls argue this guidance reset finally clears the decks for a rebound, while skeptics say UNH still hasn’t addressed the operational cracks that pushed America’s largest insurer into crisis mode.
UnitedHealth Group’s model rests on a tightly integrated flywheel. UnitedHealthcare underwrites insurance risk, while Optum supplies the data, infrastructure, and delivery systems needed to manage that risk. The two move in tandem insurance generates the risk pool, Optum delivers the clinical and operational machinery to control outcomes.
This vertical integration gives UnitedHealth a strategic edge over standalone insurers. It allows for granular control of pricing, care pathways, and data, while its short-tail insurance model provides a unique lever: annual repricing to match healthcare cost trends. That mechanism is now central to the investment case, as the company works to recover from its first earnings miss in 17 years, a stumble that pricing adjustments could eventually offset.
The scale is immense: 150 million Americans touch UnitedHealth’s ecosystem, whether through 50 million insurance members or the 70,000 physicians it directly employs or affiliates with. The scope is so broad that the company now quietly shapes access, cost, and delivery of care across the U.S. health system even for patients who are not enrolled in a UnitedHealthcare plan.
But UnitedHealth’s structure is labyrinthine, almost by design. The company has stopped issuing press releases on all but the largest acquisitions, effectively concealing its dealmaking activity from the public eye. With 2,694 subsidiaries reported as of Q3 2024, and possibly over 3,000 today, the sprawl is staggering. STAT News noted 250 new entities created or acquired last year, while Bloomberg recently uncovered “stealth sales” late in 2024 that padded earnings and helped the company beat Wall Street expectations.
Taken together, UnitedHealth has become a shadow regulator of American healthcare. Its scale and vertical integration not only underpin its competitive moat but also raise urgent questions: how much influence should a single private entity wield over who gets care, where they get it, and what they pay?
UnitedHealth’s relentless expansion into healthcare delivery has created one of the most remarkable runs in modern market history. A share purchased in 2010 for just $25.10 would have been worth $528.77 by early 2024, a gain of more than 2,000%. That meteoric rise enriched institutional investors and executives alike particularly management, whose compensation leans heavily on stock grants and options. As the company’s footprint grew, so did the fortunes of those closest to its equity.
The buying hasn’t stopped. Members of Congress have joined the rush. In May 2025, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene disclosed purchases of UnitedHealth stock totaling up to $65,000 across two trades. Texas Republican Michael McCaul also bought as much as $50,000 worth of shares that same week, while Democratic Representatives Ro Khanna and Gilbert Cisneros had already added UNH positions earlier in the year. The bipartisan interest underscores the stock’s profile as a defensive powerhouse even amid its operational struggles.
Insiders are equally aggressive. On May 16, 2025, newly reinstalled CEO Stephen Hemsley purchased 86,700 shares, a $25 million bet at an average cost of $288.57 per share. CFO John Rex and board member Kristen Gill followed suit with their own sizable buys, signaling management’s confidence that UnitedHealth’s long-term trajectory outweighs near-term turbulence.
The pattern is clear: Wall Street, Washington, and UnitedHealth’s own leadership are all doubling down on a company that has already defined an era of healthcare consolidation and still holds levers of scale, pricing, and integration unmatched by peers.
Morgan Stanley Maintains Overweight on UnitedHealth Group, Lowers Price Target to $325
B of A Securities Maintains Neutral on UnitedHealth Group, Raises Price Target to $325
JP Morgan Maintains Overweight on UnitedHealth Group, Lowers Price Target to $310
Wells Fargo Maintains Overweight on UnitedHealth Group, Lowers Price Target to $267
Baird Downgrades UnitedHealth Group to Underperform, Lowers Price Target to $198
RBC Capital Maintains Outperform on UnitedHealth Group, Lowers Price Target to $286
Oppenheimer Maintains Outperform on UnitedHealth Group, Lowers Price Target to $325
For decades, Intel’s defining advantage was its dual role as both chip designer and fabricator. This vertical integration gave the company a unique edge: it could fine-tune its designs for its own manufacturing process, ensuring performance and efficiency gains rivals couldn’t match. That model powered Intel’s dominance through the 1990s and early 2000s, with leaps like the 130nm-to-90nm transition and the introduction of Centrino, which helped make mobile computing mainstream.
But what was once a strength has become a burden. The escalating complexity and cost of leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing exposed cracks in Intel’s model. Its infamous 10nm delays signaled that the company’s “do both” strategy was no longer keeping pace with competitors. Meanwhile, TSMC’s singular focus on fabrication allowed it to leapfrog Intel, becoming the global foundry of choice for AMD, Apple, Nvidia, and others. As those partnerships thrived, Intel lost ground in performance and efficiency.
Intel has not abandoned its identity. Instead, it has doubled down backed by Washington. The CHIPS Act of 2022 injected billions into domestic semiconductor manufacturing, a policy tailwind Intel seized aggressively. With new fabs rising in Arizona, Ohio, and Oregon, the company is trying to reclaim leadership and restore U.S. capacity in a supply chain dominated by Asia. Central to this revival is Intel’s massive bet on EUV lithography acquiring a fleet of ASML’s ultra-advanced machines, tools so expensive and rare they are considered strategic assets.
This is Intel’s new gamble: that by shouldering the enormous capital and execution risk of design + manufacturing, it can reassert control of the semiconductor stack and regain its role as the anchor of America’s techindustrial base. The question now is whether that dual identity, once a source of unmatched power, can survive in a world where specialization has become the rule, not the exception.
Intel’s market position today is best described as paradoxical. By revenue, it remains one of the largest semiconductor companies on the planet. Yet in the pure foundry business, where global customers line up at the doors of TSMC and Samsung, Intel’s market share is negligible. This reflects the reality of its past: Intel was always building for itself, not for others.
That legacy has proven costly. Under CEO Pat Gelsinger, Intel poured staggering sums into CapEx:
$18.7 billion in 2021 (+31% YoY)
$24.8 billion in 2022 (+32% YoY)
$25.8 billion in 2023
$23.9 billion in 2024
Tens of billions went into the most advanced ASML EUV machines, new fabs in Arizona and Germany, and the crown jewel project in Ohio, billed as the world’s largest chip facility. But by 2024, the uncomfortable question emerged: Where’s the return?
The problem wasn’t supply. Intel built capacity at a scale few companies could rival. The problem was demand. Intel’s own design division, still struggling to regain competitiveness, wasn’t producing chips that required this capacity. And external customers already comfortable with TSMC’s reliability and scale were unwilling to entrust production to a company that had failed to execute for itself.
Markets reflected this brutal reality. After Intel’s worst year on record in 2024, with shares down 60%, the stock has bounced about 13% year-to-date a relief rally, but far from redemption.
The truth is stark: money alone cannot buy market relevance. Intel today resembles a late-stage industrial giant like Sears or Blockbuster once dominant, now scrambling to reinvent itself in an industry that moved on without it. Its rivals are so far ahead in performance, efficiency, and customer trust that the most credible path to unlocking value may be through radical restructuring. That could mean splitting Intel into separate design and manufacturing entities or, in the most dramatic scenario, selling it off for parts.
Intel still carries the weight of its legacy and its role as a symbol of U.S. technological strength. But the market is asking whether that legacy can translate into a viable future or whether it’s simply too late.
Intel stock jumped nearly 7% last week, fueled by headlines that the Trump administration is considering converting part of its CHIPS Act grant into equity, effectively giving Washington a 10% stake in the company.
At the same time, SoftBank revealed a $2 billion investment, betting on Intel’s turnaround story. On paper, it looks like two powerful endorsements.
But does this really mark the start of a sustainable rally or just the next chapter in Intel’s long, complicated saga?
The U.S. government owning nearly a tenth of Intel would be unprecedented. Historically, government support even in times of corporate crisis came in the form of grants, loans, or guarantees, not equity stakes in companies still viewed as “going concerns.” This new model raises uncomfortable questions: Is Intel too critical to fail?
Is Washington effectively nationalizing strategic capacity? And most importantly does this undermine the very purpose of the CHIPS Act, which was designed to enable competitiveness, not entangle government with corporate ownership?
For Intel, the mechanics matter. The company was slated to receive $7.9 billion in CHIPS Act funding but has only collected $2.2 billion to date. If the remaining money comes with a government equity kicker, it means issuing new shares which dilutes existing shareholders and complicates Intel’s ability to raise additional capital in the future. In effect, the cure could weaken the patient.
The backdrop here is not one of strength. Intel’s balance sheet has been wobbling for years under heavy CapEx spending, and the credit agencies are flashing red:
Fitch: downgraded to BBB, negative outlook.
S&P Global: cut to BBB from BBB+ in December.
Moody’s: slashed unsecured debt rating in August.
Intel today sits two notches above junk status, with a market desperately waiting for proof that the company can deliver results before its competitors stretch their lead further.
SoftBank’s $2 billion injection may provide a short-term narrative boost, but even that bet is speculative. The firm is known for placing bold, high-risk wagers on companies in transition sometimes transformative, sometimes disastrous (IE:Wework).
Taken together, the developments highlight the contradiction at the heart of Intel’s story. On one hand, it remains a symbol of U.S. industrial might so strategic that Washington may step in as shareholder of last resort.
On the other hand, its fundamentals continue to erode, its creditworthiness is deteriorating, and its capacity to compete with TSMC, Samsung, and NVIDIA looks increasingly out of reach.
Our view: These headlines may power a short-term pop, but they don’t solve the structural issues. Intel risks becoming a government project, propped up more for national security optics than for true competitiveness.
For investors, that makes this story less about growth and more about survival.
Intel’s sales trajectory paints a sobering picture. Revenues have slid from $79 billion in 2021 to just $53 billion in 2024, dragged down by two forces: a postCovid collapse in PC demand and aggressive market share gains from AMD.
Adding to the pain, Intel has almost no meaningful footprint in the mobile ecosystem and is miles behind in the AI chip boom two of the fastest-growing segments in semiconductors.
While the PC market is staging a modest recovery with projected low singledigit growth in 2025, Intel itself isn’t expected to benefit much. Consensus estimates call for another 2% revenue dip this year, leaving the company at about $52 billion in sales.
Margins tell an even starker story. Intel’s adjusted net margins, which hovered around 29% as recently as 2021, collapsed to 8.5% in 2023 and turned negative in 2024 as losses from its struggling foundry business piled up.
For a company that once printed cash, this reversal underscores how deeply structural the challenges are.
Intel’s playbook now rests on aggressive cost discipline and operational triage. The company is in the middle of a $1.5 billion cost-cutting initiative, which includes laying off 25,000 employees or nearly a quarter of its workforce. On paper, the logic is clear: slash expenses, tighten operations, and stabilize profitability.
Beyond cost cuts, Intel’s hope lies in execution. If its next-gen manufacturing tech can finally deliver at scale, factory utilization could improve both through more in-house chip production and by winning foundry orders from outside customers. Coupled with a lineup of more competitive CPUs, Intel may claw back some pricing power and start rebuilding margins.
Our view: The recovery narrative depends less on end-market growth and more on Intel proving it can compete on cost, on product, and on technology. But the reality is that Intel has been trying to “turn the corner” for nearly a decade, and every year the bar gets higher as competitors sprint further ahead. Cost cuts may keep the lights on, but they don’t solve the existential question: what exactly is Intel’s competitive edge in a world driven by AI and advanced fabs?
Intel’s bet on becoming a major foundry player is falling short of expectations. The foundry business alone lost nearly $13 billion last year, highlighting the gap between ambition and execution.
Meanwhile, the global foundry market is thriving: TSMC, the world’s largest pure-play foundry, expects AI-related chip revenue to double in 2025 and maintain mid-40% annual growth over the next five years.
Intel, by contrast, has captured very little of this growth.
Despite its struggles, Intel retains a unique strategic advantage: substantial U.S.-based manufacturing capacity. In an era where Washington is prioritizing domestic semiconductor production as a national security imperative, Intel is essentially the only viable domestic player.
Trump’s push for onshore chip manufacturing aligns with Intel’s existing infrastructure but the challenge remains executing efficiently.
Breaking down recent results:
Foundry business: Operating loss of $3.17 billion on $4.4 billion in revenue.
Client Computing Group (PC CPUs): $7.9 billion in sales, down 3% year-overyear.
Data Center Group (mostly server CPUs, some AI chips): $3.9 billion in revenue, up 4% year-over-year.
Takeaway: Intel has the U.S. footprint to capitalize on government incentives, but the foundry business is bleeding money, and revenue growth in PCs and servers is modest at best. The path to turning this into a profitable foundry empire remains steep, especially against TSMC’s dominant market position.
Intel projects third-quarter revenue of $13.1 billion at the midpoint of its guidance, slightly above the $12.65 billion analyst consensus.
The company expects to break even on earnings, while analysts had been modeling 4 cents per share.
For Q2, Intel posted a net loss of $2.9 billion, or 67 cents per share, compared with a $1.61 billion net loss, or 38 cents per share a year earlier. EPS was affected by an $800 million impairment charge tied to “excess tools with no identified re-use,” which translated to an approximate 20-cent adjustment.
This report marks Intel’s second earnings release under CEO Lip-Bu Tan, who took over in March. Tan has pledged to restore competitiveness, streamline management, and cut bureaucracy, including staff reductions in Oregon and California, as part of a broader turnaround strategy.
The results indicate that while Intel is still navigating losses and operational inefficiencies, there is modest top-line growth and a path toward stabilizing earnings under new leadership.
JP Morgan Maintains Underweight on Intel, Raises Price Target to $21
Rosenblatt Maintains Sell on Intel, Maintains $14
Price Target Stifel Maintains Hold on Intel, Raises Price Target to $24.5
UBS Maintains Neutral on Intel, Raises Price Target to $25
Citigroup Maintains Neutral on Intel, Raises Price Target to $24
